Well, the Cancun Conference of the Parties (called COP for short) is upon us, where everyone will sit down and accomplish pretty much nothing on a global climate change agreement. There is real concern circulating in the diplomatic world that this meeting could see the fracturing of the push for a global agreement such that it never happens – at least from this framework. This outcome is problematic in all sorts of ways, not least of which in the chaos it will unleash in the development world, where a huge amount of money was slated to be used for adaptation to climate change under what amounted to a glorified memorandum of understanding coming out of Copenhagen. If the whole process bites the dust, it isn’t very clear what happens to that money or the programs and projects under development to use it.
That said, if it all goes totally bad in Cancun it doesn’t mean that we are beyond creating meaningful paths toward a lower-emissions future that might be manageable. Indeed, one might argue that the death of the global framework might be the only way forward. States like California, and cities like New York, are now starting to implement policies and programs to cut their own emissions without a national mandate. They are creating locally-appropriate policies that maximize environmental benefit while minimizing the local “pain” of the new policies. This is all well and good for these cities, but what I find interesting is that there is some evidence – however loose- that this city-by-city, state-by-state approach might actually be more efficient at achieving our climate goals than a global agreement.
I was part of the Scenarios Working Group for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment – my group was tasked with running four future scenarios for ecosystem services (the goods and processes we get from ecosystems) under different future political, economic and social conditions. Once we got our baselines and assumptions for each scenario in place, a team of modelers ran the scenarios for various issues (temperature change, water availability, etc.) and then we attempted to link the model runs to meaningful statements about how ecosystems might fare under each scenario.
This is relevant here because, interestingly, we had a “global orchestration” scenario that, to some extent, looks like what the world was going for with Copenhagen and Cancun. We also had another scenario called “adapting mosaic”, which assumes decentralized control and adaptive management of environmental resources. Neither scenario was a clear winner – each had strengths and weaknesses. An “adapting mosaic” approach is great at managing new and emerging environmental challenges, whether from climate change or other issues. It might also serve as the very legitimate basis of a bottom-up approach to an eventual global accord on climate change. However, this approach risks ignoring global commons like fisheries, which often leads to the loss of that resource through overuse. There is a real risk that inequality will go unaddressed, at least across countries and at the global scale, but at the same time economic growth will not be as robust as under other scenarios. Global orchestration is good at maximizing income. While I dissented from this view*, the group argued that under global orchestration a Kuznets Greening Curve would kick in (as people get wealthier, they pay more attention to the environment – thus, economic growth and consumption can result in better environmental quality), and we would have strong global coordination on everything from trade to environmental issues. However, this approach is much more reactive, and focused on the global scale – thus it is not very good at dealing with local surprises. In my opinion, adapting mosaic looks better, over the long run, than global coordination (especially if you factor in my concerns about the Kuznets Curve assumption).
In short, in the efforts of California and New York we are seeing the emergence of a de facto adapting mosaic as the global orchestration efforts of Cancun and Copenhagen fall by the wayside. This actually might be a good thing.
In uncertainty, there is hope.
*the Kuznets curve rests on a key assumption – that with enough wealth, we can undo the damage we do while building wealth to the point that we start caring about the environment. Kuznets has no answer for extinction (a huge problem at the moment), as that is gone forever. Further, the Chinese are starting to provide an object lesson in how to blow up the Kuznets curve by damaging one’s environment so badly that the costs associated with fixing the problem become overwhelming – and those are the fixable problems. Basically, assuming a Kuznets Greening Curve allowed those framing these scenarios to put an overly-happy face on the global orchestration scenario for political reasons – they wanted to provide support for a global effort on climate change. A more honest reading of the data, in my opinion, would have made adapting mosaic look much better.
Author: Ed
No, dammit, no . . .
Lord, there are days . . . look, people, the connection between climate change and any sort of social behavior is complex and difficult to trace. I’ve mentioned before that the connection between climate change and conflict is not at all straightforward. So too the connection between climate change and migration/refugees. But no matter how many times we say this, people still go with the simple connection – climate change = more refugees/more migration. Take, for example, this bit of reporting at CNN.
The devastating effects of climate change and conflicts fought over ever-scarcer resources such as water could cause a surge in migration that experts fear the world is totally unprepared for.
At least one billion people will be forced from their homes between now and 2050 by such forces, the international charity group Christian Aid predicted in a recent report.
Oh, for God’s sake. Look, we’ve been over this before. There will be relatively few new refugees, and all I can offer is a very qualified maybe about more migration. Why do I say this?
First, a refugee, by definition, is someone who is forced to move (a nebulous issue) and then does move across an international border. People who are forced to move but stay in their country after moving are called internally displaced people (IDPs) – this is not merely terminology. Refugees have all sorts of rights that IDPs do not. And most work on climate and migration suggests very short moves, meaning we might see a surge in climate-related IDPs, but probably not climate refugees. Well, that and the fact that international law does not consider climate-related events as legal “forcings” that can result in refugee status. So, most people will not clear a border, and those that do will not be recognized under current law as refugees.
Second, there are a hell of a lot of assumptions here about what causes people to move and why in the context of environmental change. I’ve written on this in refereed journals, and a chunk of the first half of my book addresses this issue indirectly. Simply put, any decision to move incorporates more than an assessment of one’s material situation – it is a complex decision that takes into account a whole range of factors, including social considerations and opportunities elsewhere. These factors are locally-specific, and therefore any wide, general claim about the number of likely refugees is mostly crap – we simply don’t know.
So where did the crappy analysis come from? Oh, right, this crap story was built on a completely crap report that I complained about just recently. Crap begetting crap. Super.
Yep, this is about right . . .
Yeah, the level of discourse around climate-related topics is pretty low these days . . . not that it has been elevated for a very long time. Still, the folks at RealClimate hacked a political cartoon and got it right:
Yep.
Letting someone else make the point . . .
Well, it’s about a year ago that the “climategate” email hack broke on the world, with a lot of sound and fury that, in the end, signified nothing. I’ve dealt with this plenty of times, and I am too tired to do it again. But there are great posts all over the place – like Peter Gleick here and Gavin Schmidt here. Folks, its all a pack of little distractions from the big problems in front of us – and arguing that the future is uncertain is not reassuring. Uncertainty is what worries me – predictable change can be managed, but nonlinear, unpredictable change can disrupt society significantly . . .
There's a really bad former colony joke in here . . .
Hey, the IMF is in Ireland! Super. Should be interesting to see how they treat a non-poor country . . . and what the hell would Irish structural adjustment look like, I wonder? Actually, I shouldn’t wonder . . . since we will likely find out shortly. Let’s all watch the loss of sovereignty. Ugh.
Perhaps we could fix this by simply forcing U2 to bring its business operations back to the country. Ooops, was that out loud?
Common cause . . .
You know, it is not often that you can draw a direct analogy between events here in the US, and events in places like sub-Saharan Africa . . . but today we have one! Sadly, it’s not a happy one.
Yesterday, the Beeb reported on protests in Malawi over an effort to set the retirement age at 55 for women and 60 for men. Why the protests, you ask? Well, because life expectancy in Malawi is about 50 years . . . so this is a bit like asking the US to accept an increase in the age of retirement for social security to 80.
Well, the analogy doesn’t hold all that well – actually, most of my colleagues in Ghana, where mandatory retirement from state-funded jobs starts at 60, would like to see that age lifted to 65 or more so they could keep earning a salary. But this points up a larger issue – that these colleagues of mine are highly educated and make good (by local standards) salaries. They are also more likely to live well past the average lifespan in Ghana (about 59 years). For those with less education, working in lower-paying jobs, even a retirement age of 60 is a bit of a cruel joke, as they are unlikely to ever get there. In other words, there is an income dimension to life expectancy that makes the issue of a single, blanket retirement age in places like Malawi and Ghana inherently unfair . . .
So, it is really interesting that, just as we start hearing about various plans to reduce the US deficit, and indeed our massive national debt, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) ran a study on life expectancy and retirement ages, and came to an African-sounding conclusion here in the US:
Raising the retirement age for Social Security would disproportionately hurt low-income workers and minorities, and increase disability claims by older people unable to work, government auditors told Congress.
The projected spike in disability claims could harm Social Security’s finances because disability benefits typically are higher than early retirement payments, the General Accountability Office concluded. (via Businessweek)
Paul Krugman makes the point a bit more starkly:
Working until you’re 69, which may sound doable for people with desk jobs, is a lot harder for the many Americans who still do physical labor.
But beyond that, the proposal seemingly ignores a crucial point: while average life expectancy is indeed rising, it’s doing so mainly for high earners, precisely the people who need Social Security least. Life expectancy in the bottom half of the income distribution has barely inched up over the past three decades. So the Bowles-Simpson proposal is basically saying that janitors should be forced to work longer because these days corporate lawyers live to a ripe old age.
Can we spend money forever? No. But is it fair to start pushing the benefits people have contributed to for their whole lives via their taxes out of reach in the name of deficit reduction? No. We are going to have to create a very nuanced set of reforms here, that recognize whose benefits should start when, if we are to have anything that looks like justice – either here or in Africa. One size fits all is not, in fact, fair . . . and as someone whose retirement age would likely be raised under any plan (given my income and job description), I am strongly in favor of justice, even if that means some people get to retire before I do . . . besides, according to the GAO, we need to consider this or we will blow up social security even sooner, which means no benefits for anyone. Now, let’s see if people can grab onto this point and use it to force a real conversation about spending that doesn’t turn deficit reduction into another hammer used on the poor, here or abroad.
And why, oh why, is there really no discussion about raising the Social Security taxed maximum wage (the “cap”)? I wonder how many Americans understand that Social Security taxes are only collected on the first $106800 of wages, and after that they disappear. Yep, that means that the bulk of Americans (roughly the bottom 92%) pay Social Security taxes on roughly 85% of their taxable income, while the top 8% enjoy what amounts to a 6-ish percent tax cut on that income after $106800. This is obscene. While there is significant debate about how much additional revenue we would gather from eliminating this largely arbitrary cap, or how much that income would help, removing the cap would certainly raise revenue, help the situation, and correct an absurd component of our tax system . . .
Big shifts coming . . . or not
Well, this is interesting, to say the least. Someone decided to get cute and leak the draft of the new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review – yeah, the one marked NODIS (No Distribution). State runs a tight ship, so my guess is that someone on the Hill leaked this. Hard to say why, exactly. But it is very interesting reading, both from the perspective of someone in one of the agencies in question, but also from the perspective of development studies in general.
Well, now it is out there, so go here to have a look.
I will refrain from offering my comments – I think that probably steps over a line given my current official position – but have a look and see what you think. I do think that Josh Rogin’s story on this has a very interesting set of comments from Todd Shelton at InterAction. I will note, though, that we heard informal messages from the upper reaches of the Agency that this document is a draft, and by no means finalized . . . though one wonders what impact this leak will have on the editing process.
And I'm back . . .
OK, page proofs are done. Index is mostly done . . . well, it is out of my hands, anyway. Jacket copy approved. Happy blurbs from Mickey Glantz and Andrew Rice secured for the jacket. Nice author photo for the jacket taken (by Scott). Yep, pretty much done here . . . which means I can now get back to hassling the internet. Wheeeee!
To celebrate, I bring you a completely unfair piece of insanity. I know I come to this late, but this is so nuts I simply could not let it go. Well, that and this may have a direct impact on my work life in the very near future . . . that’s right, it’s the battle for leadership of the House Energy and Commerce Committee! And why, you ask, does a fairly esoteric battle for what seems to be a marginal committee (it’s not) rise to my attention? Because one of the candidates, John Shimkus, is arguing that while climate change is real, we don’t have to do anything about it because, and I quote:
“I do believe in the Bible as the final word of God,” Shimkus said. “And I do believe that God said the Earth would not be destroyed by a flood” (via Politico)
By flood, I presume he means sea-level rise. And by Earth, I can only presume he means his great state of Illinois, which is a hell of a long way from the nearest ocean (though Great Lakes rise could cause serious problems for Chicago). I suspect there are a bunch of people in low-lying parts of Bangladesh and Vietnam, as well as a number of island states like Tuvalu, who are pretty much looking down the barrel of the world being destroyed by flood who might take issue with this particular mashup of climate science and the Bible, regardless of their religious background.
Holy crap.
This is old Bjorn Lomborg read through Genesis (new Bjorn Lomborg has reconsidered the math, and now thinks we should do something, though it is mostly adaptation) . . . and Rep. Shimkus might have some influence over the use of federal aid dollars for climate change work.
Look, it is one thing to debate those parts of the science that are not settled (a relatively small amount), and further to debate what to do about the impacts of what is already happening, and what is very likely to happen . . . but it is entirely another to announce that we don’t have to worry about such impacts at all because, even though climate change is real, God will save us. History is littered with the bodies of people who waited for God to save them. God helps those who help themselves – not those who sit around waiting for miracles . . . but it seems Rep. Shimkus’ reading of the Bible didn’t quite make it to the New Testament.
Page proofs . . .
are killing me. But, the book is here, and I am cleaning it up. I hate page proofs. Deeply. This is the sort of detail work I loathe – combing back through 90,000 words looking for misspellings and erroneous punctuation. It is taking days, because you can only focus that hard for so long. And at the same time, I am cleaning up the index.
Oh, and that is on top of the article that was due back in today – I worked with two of my Ph.D. students, Mary Thompson and Manali Baruah, to produce a paper that examines how REDD+ functions as a form of unacknowledged environmental governance (defining legitimate terms and actors within debates over how to implement terrestrial carbon sequestration projects in forest areas). We’ll see how it does in this round of peer review.
And then there is the talk I am supposed to be giving at UNC – Chapel Hill on Friday. I’ll be discussing how we think about livelihoods in development, how current framings might have carried us as far as they are going to, and what a new framing might look like. Yeah, it is coming together, but not as quickly as I’d hoped.
But, without further ado, the first few hundred words of Delivering Development:
Global food prices again . . . but maybe a solution!
New Scientist has an interview with the authors of a recent report that blames food price shifts on financial market manipulation and speculation. Worth reading – they are quite clear in their argument.
Is this another crisis like the one we had in 2008?
Not quite. Maximo Torero of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington DC notes that oil, the real driver of food prices and of the 2008 crisis, is relatively cheap, at around $75 a barrel, not over $100 as it was in 2008.
In 2008, both immediate grain prices, and the prices offered for future grain purchases in commodities markets, climbed steadily for months, whereas now they are spiking and dipping more unpredictably, which economists call volatility.
“The market fundamentals – supply and demand – do not warrant the price increases we have seen,” says Torero. Not all harvests have been bad, and after 2008 countries rebuilt grain stocks. “There are enough stocks in the US alone to cover the expected losses in Russia.”
The food riots in Mozambique were not due to world grain prices, he says, but because Mozambique devalued its currency, making imported food more expensive.
So what has been happening this year?
Markets are responding nervously to incomplete information. First there was a series of shocks: Russia’s export ban, lower maize forecasts, then, days later, a US ruling to allow more bioethanol in fuel which seemed likely to further reduce the maize – the main source of bioethanol – available for food. Meanwhile there was no reliable information about grain stocks, which is strategic information that most countries keep secret.
The result was nervous bidding and sporadically surging prices in commodity markets. And that attracted the real problem: investors wielding gargantuan sums of speculative capital and hoping to make a killing. When speculation exacerbated the price crisis of 2008, Joachim von Braun of the University of Bonn, Germany, then head of IFPRI, predicted that it would continue causing problems. “We saw that one coming and it came,” he says. “Food markets have new design flaws, with their inter-linkages to financial markets.”
Volatility also makes it harder to solve the long-term, underlying problem –inadequate food production – by making farmers and banks reluctant to invest in improved agricultural technology as they are unsure of what returns they will get. “Investment in more production alone will not solve the problem,” says von Braun. As long as extreme speculation causes constant price bubbles and crashes, either farmers will not get good enough returns to continue investing in production, or consumers will not be able to afford the food.
“Without action to curb excessive speculation, we will see further increases in these volatilities,” he says.
h/t to Resilience Science
This is very interesting, but what I found intriguing about this article was the researchers’ suggestion for how to address this uncertainty – transparency and information about supplies via remote sensing:
All the major producers already use remote sensing technology to watch each other’s fields. If countries would reveal just once what stocks they hold, says Torero, the satellite images can be used to calculate whether those stocks have risen or fallen, as growing conditions change. “All we need to know is the baseline,” he says. Reliable information about stocks could offset unwarranted jitters about crop failures, such as the ones that are contributing to the current market volatility.
Von Braun goes farther: he says there should be a global technical organisation that keeps track of world grain stocks and production, and which decides, using complex computerised models of world food markets, what range of grain prices are actually warranted by real supply and demand. Then if speculation starts to drive prices up out of this band, countries could intervene on markets, buying and selling just enough to counter speculative pressure. “This doesn’t stop speculation, just extreme speculation,” he says.
He thinks it would take a fund of $20-$30 billion to do the trick. In September the World Bank extended a $2 billion fund to respond to food price crises, but that is aimed at helping the poorest survive price spikes rather than intervening to stop them happening.
You may or not like the idea of a global organization or fund, but the idea of actually monitoring the supplies of the commodities to examine if pricing reflects actual market dynamics (supply/demand controlled for expected future conditions) is fantastic and already possible. The only people who would lose here are those whose only skill set is in exploiting the uncertainty and lack of information in the market for their own profit – especially those willing to exacerbate uncertainty and opacity to generate larger profits.